Auctions & Mechanism Design Basics

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- We study about a kind of science of *rule-making*.
- ► To make it simple, we first consider single-item auctions.
- We will go over some basics about first-price auctions and second-price auctions.
- Also, we will talk about
 - incentive guarantees,
 - strong performance guarantees, and
 - computational efficiency

in an auction.

We will end the discussion with Myerson's Lemma.

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Outline

Single-Item Auctions

Sealed-Bid Auctions

First-Price Auctions Second-Price Auctions Case Study: Sponsored Search Auctions

Myerson's Lemma

Single-Parameter Environments The Lemma Application to the Sponsored Search Auction

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For example, an antiquated furniture.

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Bidders are interested in buying this furniture.

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 - Her maximum willingness-to-pay for it.
 - v_i is private.
 - Unknown to the seller and other bidders.

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Sealed-Bid Auctions

Sealed-Bid Auction

- (i) Each bidder *i* privately communicates a bid *b_i* to the seller—in a sealed envelope.
- (ii) The seller decides who gets the item (if any).
- (iii) The seller decides the selling price.



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- (i) Each bidder *i* privately communicates a bid *b_i* to the seller—in a sealed envelope.
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Step (ii): The selection rule. We consider giving the item to the highest bidder.

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First-Price auction

First-Price

The winning bidder pays her bid.


But it's hard to reason about.

First-Price auction

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The winning bidder pays her bid.

- But it's hard to reason about.
- ► Why?



For a bidder: Hard to figure how to bid.

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For a bidder: Hard to figure how to bid.For the seller:

For a bidder: Hard to figure how to bid.For the seller: Hard to predict what will happen.

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- Suppose that you are participating in the first-price auction.
- Your valuation for the item: the number of your birth month + the day of your birth.

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- Suppose that there is another bidder who has the same valuation like you.

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 - Would it help to know your opponent's birthday?

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 - Your valuation is between 2 and 43.
- Suppose that there is another bidder who has the same valuation like you.
 - Would it help to know your opponent's birthday?
 - Would your answer change if you knew there were two other bidders rather than one?

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eBay/Yahoo auction

If you bid \$100 and win, do you pay \$100?

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If you bid \$100 and win, do you pay \$100?
eBay increases your bid on your behalf until
Your maximum bid is reached, or
You are the highest bidder
whichever comes first.

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- eBay increases your bid on your behalf until
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whichever comes first.

 For example, if the highest other bid is \$90. You only pay \$90 + ε for some small increment ε.
≈ highest other bid!

Second-Price auction

Second-Price/Vickrey Auction

The highest bidder wins and pays a price equal to the second-highest bid.

Is such a strategy a dominant strategy?

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Second-Price auction

Second-Price/Vickrey Auction

The highest bidder wins and pays a price equal to the second-highest bid.

- Is such a strategy a dominant strategy?
 - The strategy is guaranteed to maximize a bidder's utility no matter what other bidders do.

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Truthfully Bidding Is Dominant Here

Proposition (Incentives in Second-Price Auctions)

In a second-price auction, every bidder *i* has a dominant strategy: set the bid $b_i = v_i$, equal to her private valuation.



Proof of the Proposition

- Fix a bidder *i* with valuation v_i .
- **b**: the vector of all bids.
- **b**_i: the vector of **b** with b_i removed.
- * **Goal**: Show that bidder *i*'s utility is maximized by setting $b_i = v_i$.

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Proposition 2 (Nonnegative Utility)

In a second-price auction, every truthfully bidder is guaranteed nonnegative utility.

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How about the winners?

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Second-Price Single-Item Auctions are "ideal"

Definition (Dominant-Strategy Incentive Compatible)

An auction is dominant-strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) if

- truthful bidding is a dominant strategy for every bidder, and
- truthful bidders always obtain nonnegative utility.



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Social Welfare

The social welfare of an outcome of a single-item auction is

$$\sum_{i=1}^n v_i x_i.$$

where $\sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i \leq 1$; $x_i = 1$ if bidder *i* wins and 0 if she loses.

Second-Price Single-Item Auctions are "ideal" (contd.)

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So such an auction is welfare maximizing if bids are truthful.

Second-Price Single-Item Auctions are "ideal" (contd.)

Theorem

A second-price single-item auction satisfies:

(1) DSIC.

(2) Welfare maximizing.

(3) It can be implemented in polynomial time.

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In fact, (3) is linear.
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Second-Price Single-Item Auctions are "ideal" (contd.)

Theorem

A second-price single-item auction satisfies:

- (1) DSIC. (strong incentive guarantees)
- (2) Welfare maximizing. (strong performance guarantees)
- (3) It can be implemented in polynomial time. (computational efficiency)

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Background

The Social Dilemma (2020) - Trailer

- ► Web search results:
 - relevant to your query (by an algorithm, e.g., PageRank).
 - pops out a list of sponsored links.
 - They are paid by advertisers.
- Every time you give a search query into a search engine, an auction is run in real time to decide
 - which advertiser's links are shown,
 - how these links are arranged visually,
 - what the advertisers are charged.

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- Let's say the items for sale are k "slots" on a search results page.
- Bidders: the advertisers who have a bid on the keyword that was searched on.
 - On the keyword, "university", NTU, NYCU, NCKU, TKU, etc., might be the bidders.

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 - On the keyword, "camera", Nikon, Canon, Sony, etc., might be the bidders.
 - On the keyword, "SUV", Toyota, Ford, Honda, Porsche, etc., might be the bidders.
- Let's say the items are not identical.
 - Higher slots are more valuable. What do you think?

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• Consider the click-through-rates (CTRs) α_j of slot *j*.

- The probability that the user clicks on this slot.
- Assumption: $\alpha_1 \geq \alpha_2 \geq \ldots \alpha_k$.

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Multiple Items for Sponsored Search Auctions

• Consider the click-through-rates (CTRs) α_j of slot j.

- The probability that the user clicks on this slot.
- Assumption: $\alpha_1 \geq \alpha_2 \geq \ldots \alpha_k$.

Each advertiser *i* has a quality score β_i .

• The CTR of advertiser *i* in slot *j*: $\beta_i \alpha_j$.

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Multiple Items for Sponsored Search Auctions

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 - Assumption: $\alpha_1 \geq \alpha_2 \geq \ldots \alpha_k$.
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 - The CTR of advertiser *i* in slot *j*: $\beta_i \alpha_j$.
- The expected value derived by advertiser *i* from slot *j*: $v_i \alpha_j$
- The social welfare is $\sum_{i=1}^{n} v_i x_i$.
 - \blacktriangleright x_i: the CTR of the slot to which bidder *i* is assigned.
 - $x_i = 0$: bidder *i* is not assigned to a slot.
 - Each slot can only be assigned to one bidder; each bidder gets only one slot.

Our Design Approach

- Who wins what?Who pays what?
- ► The payment.

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Our Design Approach

- Who wins what?
- Who pays what?
- ► The payment.
 - If the payments are not just right, then the strategic bidders will game the system.

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Our Design Approach

Design Steps

- (a): Assume that the bidders bid truthfully. Then, how should we assign bidders to slots so that property (2) and (3) holds?
- (b): Given the answer of above, how should we set selling prices so that property (1) holds?



Step (a)

Given truthful bids. For i = 1, 2, ..., k, assign the ith highest bid to the ith best slot.

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- Given truthful bids. For i = 1, 2, ..., k, assign the ith highest bid to the ith best slot.
- You can prove that this assignment achieves the maximum social welfare as an exercise.

Step (b)

There is an analog of the second-price rule.

- ► DSIC.
- ★ Myerson's lemma.

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There is an analog of the second-price rule.

- DSIC.
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A powerful and general tool for implementing this second step.

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Single-Parameter Environments

Consider a more generalized and abstract setting:

Single-Parameter Environments

- n agents (e.g., bidders).
- ▶ A private valuation $v_i \ge 0$ for each agent *i* (per unit of stuff).
- A feasible set $X = \{(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) \mid x_i \in \mathbb{R}\} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$.
 - > x_i : amount of stuff given to agent *i*.

Single-Parameter Environments (Examples)

Single-item auction:

•
$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} X_i \le 1$$
, and $x_i \in \{0, 1\}$ for each *i*.

Single-Parameter Environments (Examples)

Single-item auction:

• $\sum_{i=1}^{n} X_i \leq 1$, and $x_i \in \{0,1\}$ for each *i*.

k-Unit auction:

• k identical items, $\sum_{i=1}^{n} X_i \leq k$, and $x_i \in \{0, 1\}$ for each i.

Single-Parameter Environments (Examples)

Single-item auction:

• $\sum_{i=1}^{n} X_i \leq 1$, and $x_i \in \{0,1\}$ for each *i*.

k-Unit auction:

- k identical items, $\sum_{i=1}^{n} X_i \leq k$, and $x_i \in \{0, 1\}$ for each i.
- Sponsored Search Auction:
 - X: the set of *n*-vectors \Leftrightarrow assignments of bidders to slots.
 - ▶ Each slot (resp., bidder) is assigned to ≤ 1 bidder (resp., slot).
 - The component $x_i = \alpha_j$: bidder *i* is assigned to slot *j*.
 - α_j : the click-through rate of slot *j*.
 - Assume that the quality score $\beta_i = 1$ for all *i*.

Allocation and Payment Rules

Choices to make in a sealed-bid auction

- Collect bids $\boldsymbol{b} = (b_1, \ldots, b_n)$.
- ▶ Allocation Rule: Choose a feasible $\mathbf{x}(\mathbf{b}) \in X \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$.

▶ Payment Rule: Choose payments $p(b) \in \mathbb{R}^n$.

A direct-revelation mechanism.

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A direct-revelation mechanism.

Example of *indirect mechanism*: iterative ascending auction.

Allocation and Payment Rules (contd.)

With allocation rule \boldsymbol{x} and payment rule \boldsymbol{p} ,

- > agent *i* receives utility $u_i(\mathbf{b}) = v_i \cdot x_i(\mathbf{b}) p_i(\mathbf{b})$.
- $\triangleright p_i(\boldsymbol{b}) \in [0, b_i \cdot x_i(\boldsymbol{b})].$
 - $p_i(\mathbf{b}) \ge 0$: prohibiting the seller from paying the agents.
 - ▶ $p_i(\mathbf{b}) \le b_i \cdot x_i(\mathbf{b})$: a truthful agent receives nonnegative utility.

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 - ▶ $p_i(\mathbf{b}) \leq b_i \cdot x_i(\mathbf{b})$: a truthful agent receives nonnegative utility. Why?

Definition (Implementable Allocation Rule)

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Bidding higher can only get you more stuff! So, how about awarding the item to the second-highest bidder? You raise your bid, you might lose the chance of getting it!

Outline

Single-Item Auctions

Sealed-Bid Auctions

First-Price Auctions Second-Price Auctions Case Study: Sponsored Search Auctions

Myerson's Lemma

Single-Parameter Environments The Lemma

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Theorem (Myerson's Lemma)


Fix a single-parameter environment.

- (i) An allocation rule x is implementable if and only if it is monotone.
- (ii) If \boldsymbol{x} is monotone, then there is a unique payment rule for which the direct-revelation mechanism $(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{p})$ is DSIC and $p_i(\boldsymbol{b}) = 0$ whenever $b_i = 0$.
- (iii) The payment rule in (ii) is given by an explicit formula.

"Monotone" is more operational.

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Allocation curves: allocation as a function of bids



Figures from Tim Roughgarden's lecture notes.

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Say agent i has a private valuation z and free to submit a false bid y or agent i has a private valuation y and free to submit a false bid z

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 \Rightarrow every implementable allocation rule is monotone (why?)

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Try: fix z and let y tend to z.

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- Try: fix z and let y tend to z.
- Taking $y \to z$

 \Rightarrow left-hand and right-hand sides \rightarrow 0 if there is no jump in x at z.

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
Taking $y \rightarrow z$ \Rightarrow left-hand and right-hand sides $\rightarrow 0$ if there is no jump in x at z.

$$p_i(b_i,oldsymbol{b}_{-i}) = \sum_{j=1}^\ell z_j \cdot [ext{ jump in } x_i(\cdot,oldsymbol{b}_{-i}) ext{ at } z_j],$$

where z_1, \ldots, z_ℓ are breakpoints of $x_i(\cdot, \boldsymbol{b}_{-i})$ in the range $[0, b_i]$.


$$egin{aligned} &z\cdot(x(y)-x(z))\leq p(y)-p(z)\leq y\cdot(x(y)-x(z))\ &p_i(b_i,oldsymbol{b}_{-i})=\sum_{j=1}^\ell z_j\cdot [ext{ jump in }x_i(\cdot,oldsymbol{b}_{-i}) ext{ at }z_j], \end{aligned}$$

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Joseph C.-C. Lin

CSIE, TKU, TW

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Case: x is a monotone function

$$z \cdot (x(y) - x(z)) \leq p(y) - p(z) \leq y \cdot (x(y) - x(z)).$$

- Suppose x is differentiable.
- **b** Dividing the inequalities by y z:

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
Application to the Sponsored Search Auction

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
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The allocation rule is piecewise.




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Exercise 1 (4%)

Recall that in the model of sponsored search auctions:

- There are k slots, the jth slot has a click-through rate (CTR) of α_j (nonincreasing in j).
- The utility of bidder i in slot j is α_j(v_i p_j), where v_i is the private value-per-click of the bidder and p_j is the price charged per-click in slot j.

▶ The Generalized Second Price (GSP) Auction is defined as follows:

Exercise 1 (5%) (contd.)

The Generalized Second Price (GSP) Auction

- 1. Rank advertisers from highest to lowest bid; assume without loss of generality that $b_1 \ge b_2 \ge \cdots \ge b_n$.
- 2. For i = 1, 2, ..., k, assign the *i*th bidder to the *i* slot.
- 3. For i = 1, 2, ..., k, charge the *i*th bidder a price of b_{i+1} per click.
- (a) Prove that for every $k \ge 2$ and sequence $\alpha_1 \ge \cdots \ge \alpha_k > 0$ of CTRs, the GSP auction is NOT DSIC. (*Hint: Find out an example.*)
- (b) A bid profile **b** with $b_1 \ge \cdots \ge b_n$ is envy-free if for every bidder *i* and slot $j \ne i$,

$$\alpha_i(\mathbf{v}_i - \mathbf{b}_{i+1}) \geq \alpha_j(\mathbf{v}_i - \mathbf{b}_{j+1}).$$

Please verify that every envy-free bid profile is an equilibrium.