### Computing Equilibria in Anonymous Games

#### Constantinos Daskalakis and Christos Papadimitriou

FOCS 2007.

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### References

- Constantinos Daskalakis and Christos Papadimitriou: "Computing Equilibria in Anonymous Games." *FOCS* 2007.
- Constantinos Daskalakis and Christos Papadimitriou: "Discretized Multinomial Distributions and Nash Equilibria in Anonymous Games." FOCS 2008.
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### Outline



2 The Two-strategy Case





Joseph C.-C. Lin (Academia Sinica, TW) Approx. NE 2-strategy anonymous games

Approx. NE 2-strategy anonymous games Introduction

#### Authors



"Will you come to FOCS? This decision depends on many factors, but one of them is HOW MANY other theoreticians will come."



### PTAS for two-strategy anonymous games

The main idea:

- Round the mixed strategies of the players to some nearby multiple of  $\epsilon$ .
- Each such quantized mixed strategy can be considered as a pure strategy.
- Exhaustively search for the solution (polynomial time in *n*).
- \* The only problem: Why should the expected utilities before and after the quantization be close?



# Rough idea of the key probabilistic lemma

- Players strategies: *n* Bernoulli random variables.
  - with probabilities  $p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_n$ ).
- There exists a way to round the probabilities to multiples of 1/z, for any z, so that:
  - the distribution of the sum of these *n* random variables is affected only by an additive  $O(1/\sqrt{z})$  in total variational (TV) distance.
  - Such a TV distance is independent of *n*.
- $\triangleright O(n^{1/\epsilon^2})$  PTAS to find an  $O(1/\sqrt{z})$ -NE for a two-strategy anonymous game.



# The total variation distance (recall)

#### The total variation distance

 $\mathbb{P},\mathbb{Q}:$  two distributions supported by a finite set  $\mathcal{A}.$ 

$$||\mathbb{P} - \mathbb{Q}|| \triangleq ||\mathbb{P} - \mathbb{Q}||_{TV} = \frac{1}{2} \cdot \sum_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} |\mathbb{P}(\alpha) - \mathbb{Q}(\alpha)|.$$

Recall: For  $f : \{0, \ldots, n\} \mapsto [0, 1]$ ,

$$\sum_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} f(\alpha) \cdot (\mathbb{P}(\alpha) - \mathbb{Q}(\alpha)) \le 2\delta.$$

if  $||\mathbb{P} - \mathbb{Q}|| \leq \delta$ .



### The main theorem

#### Theorem 1

- $\{p_i\}_{i=1}^n$ : arbitrary probabilities,  $p_i \in [0, 1]$  for i = 1, ..., n.
- $\{X_i\}_{i=1}^n$ : independent indicator random variables,  $\mathbf{E}[X_i] = p_i$ .
- z > 0: a positive integer.

Then there exists another set of probabilities  $\{q_i\}_{i=1}^n$ ,  $q_i \in [0, 1]$  for  $i \in [n]$ , which satisfy the following properties:

**1** 
$$|q_i - p_i| = O(1/z)$$
, for all  $i \in [n]$ .

2  $q_i$  is an integer multiple of 1/z, for all  $i \in [n]$ .

**(3)** if  $\{Y_i\}_{i=1}^n$  are independent indicator random variables such that  $\mathbf{E}[Y_i] = q_i$ , then

$$\left\|\sum_{i}X_{i}-\sum_{i}Y_{i}\right\|=O(z^{-1/2}),$$

and for all  $j \in [n]$ ,

$$\left\|\sum_{i,i\neq j}X_i-\sum_{i,i\neq j}Y_i\right\|=O(z^{-1/2}).$$

#### The constructive proof for the PTAS for the two-strategy case

#### Corollary 1

There is a PTAS for finding a mixed NE for the two-player anonymous game.

Sketch of the proof:

- Let  $(p_1, \ldots, p_n)$  be a mixed NE of the game.
- <u>Claim</u>:  $q_1, \ldots, q_n$  specified by Theorem 1 constitute an  $O(1/\sqrt{z})$ -approximated mixed NE.
- The absolute change of the expected utility of player *i*: bounded by  $\|\sum_{j\neq i} X_j \sum_{j\neq i} Y_j\|_{TV}$ .
  - The distribution over  $\prod_{n=1}^{2}$  defined by  $\{p_i\}_{i=1}^{n}$  is replaced by  $\{q_i\}_{i=1}^{n}$ :
  - \* **<u>Recall</u>**:  $\prod_{n=1}^{k} = \{(x_1, \ldots, x_k) \in ([k] \cup \{0\})^k \mid \sum_{i=1}^{k} x_i = n-1\}$ : the set of all the ways to partition n-1 players into the k strategies.
- Yet, how to compute such  $\{q_i\}_{i=1}^n$ ?

# Sketch of the proof of Corollary 1 (computation of $q_i$ 's)

- Remember,  $q_i$  is an integer multiple of 1/z, for each *i*.
- We proceed with a related (z + 1)-strategy game, for  $z = O(\frac{1}{\epsilon^2})$ , and seek for its pure NE.

#### The new (z+1)-strategy game

The *j*-th pure strategy,  $j \in [z] \cup \{0\}$ , corresponds to a player in the original game playing strategy 2 w.p.  $\frac{j}{z}$ .

• The payoffs resulting from the new game: translating the pure strategy profile into a mixed strategy profile of the original game.



# Sketch of the proof of Corollary 1 (computation of $q_i$ 's)

- For any player *i*, with its strategy  $j \in [z] \cup \{0\}$ , and any partition  $x \in \prod_{n=1}^{z+1}$ , we can compute its payoff by dynamic programming [e.g., Papadimitriou @STOC 2005].
  - $n^{O(z)} = n^{O(1/\epsilon)}$  time overall.
- The remaining details are omitted.



### Some naïve methods of rounding seem to fail

#### • Rounding to the closest multiple of 1/z.

- A counterexample:  $p_i := 1/n$ ,  $\forall i$ .
- The trivial rounding make  $q_i := 0, \forall i$ .
- $\triangleright \ \|\sum_i X_i \sum_i Y_i\|_{TV} \to 1 1/e \text{ as } n \to \infty.$
- Randomized Rounding:
  - Independently rounding each p<sub>i</sub> to some random q<sub>i</sub> which is an integer multiple of 1/z such that E[q<sub>i</sub>] = p<sub>i</sub>.
  - Seems promising since  $\mathbf{E}[\Pr[\sum_{i} Y_{i} = \ell]] = \Pr[\sum_{i} X_{i} = \ell]$ (correct expectation).
  - ▷ The trouble: **E**[Pr[ $\sum_i Y_i = \ell$ ]] is very small.
    - Concentration seems to require z scaling polynomially in n.



### The intuition of Theorem 1's proof

- The distribution of  $\sum_{i} X_{i}$  should be close (in TV distance) to a Poisson distribution of the same mean  $\sum_{i} p_{i}$ .
- Hence, if we define q<sub>i</sub>'s (as multiples of 1/z) in such a way that the means ∑<sub>i</sub> p<sub>i</sub> and ∑<sub>i</sub> q<sub>i</sub> are close, then the distribution of ∑<sub>i</sub> Y<sub>i</sub> should be close (in TV distance) to the same Poisson distribution, and hence to the distribution of ∑<sub>i</sub> X<sub>i</sub>.
- <u>The trouble</u>: approximation by Poisson distribution works well only when the *p<sub>i</sub>*'s are relatively small.
- ▷ The approach:
  - Use translated Poisson distributions for those *p<sub>i</sub>*'s of intermediate values.
  - Use Poisson distributions for those  $p_i$ 's close to 0 or 1.



## The translated Poisson distributions

#### The translated Poisson distributions (TP) [Röllin 2006]

We say that an integer random variable Y has a *translated Poisson* distribution  $\mathcal{L}(Y) = TP(\mu, \sigma^2)$  with parameters  $\mu$  and  $\sigma^2$  if

$$\mathcal{L}(Y) = \mathsf{Poisson}(\sigma^2 + \{\mu - \sigma^2\}),$$

where  $\{\mu - \sigma^2\}$  represents the fractional part of  $\mu - \sigma^2$ .



### Categories of the $p_i$ 's

• First, we define the following subintervals of [0,1] (for some  $\alpha \in (0,1)$ ):

• 
$$\mathcal{L}(z) := [0, \frac{\lfloor z^{\alpha} \rfloor}{z}).$$

• 
$$\mathcal{M}_1(z) := \begin{bmatrix} \lfloor z^{\alpha} \rfloor \\ z \end{bmatrix}, \frac{z/2}{z} \end{bmatrix}.$$

• 
$$\mathcal{M}_2(z) := [\frac{z/z}{z}, 1 - \frac{|z|}{z}]$$
  
•  $\mathcal{H}(z) := [1 - \frac{|z^{\alpha}|}{z}, 1].$ 

- Denote by  $\mathcal{L}^*(z) := \{i \mid \mathbf{E}[X_i] \in \mathcal{L}(z)\}$ 
  - Similarly for  $\mathcal{M}_1^*(z)$ ,  $\mathcal{M}_2^*(z)$ , and  $\mathcal{H}^*(z)$ ).



### Some building blocks

#### Lemma 1

$$\left|\sum_{i\in\mathcal{L}^*(z)}X_i-\sum_{i\in\mathcal{L}^*(z)}Y_i\right|\leq\frac{3}{z^{1-\alpha}}.$$

#### Lemma 2

$$\left\|\sum_{i\in\mathcal{M}_1^*(z)}X_i-\sum_{i\in\mathcal{M}_1^*(z)}Y_i\right\|\leq O(z^{-(\alpha+\beta-1)/2)})+O(z^{-\alpha})+O(z^{1/2})+O(z^{-(1-\beta)}),$$

for some  $\beta \in (0, 1)$  such that  $\alpha + \beta > 1$ .

• Symmetric arguments for  $\mathcal{M}_2^*(z)$  and  $\mathcal{H}^*(z)$ .



# Putting everything together...

Suppose that the random variables  $\{Y_i\}_i$  are mutually independent.

$$\left\|\sum_{i} X_{i} - \sum_{i} Y_{i}\right\| = O(z^{-(1-\alpha)}) + O(z^{-\frac{\alpha+\beta-1}{2}}) + O(z^{-\alpha}) + O(z^{-1/2}) + O(z^{-(1-\beta)}).$$
(\*)

Setting  $\alpha = \beta = \frac{3}{4}$ , we get (\*) =  $O(z^{-1/4})$ . More delicate arguments establish an  $O(z^{-1/2})$  bound.



# Categorize the expectations $\{\mathbf{E}[X_i]\}_i$





Consider the interval 
$$\mathcal{L}(z):=[0,rac{\lfloor z^lpha
floor}{z})$$

Define  $Y_i$ ,  $i \in \mathcal{L}^*(z)$  via the following iterative procedure.

• 
$$\epsilon_0 := 0;$$
  
• for  $j \leftarrow 0$  to  $\lfloor z^{\alpha} \rfloor - 1$ :  
(a)  $S_j := \epsilon_j + \sum_{i=1}^{n_j} \delta_i^j;$   
(b)  $m_j := \lfloor \frac{S_j}{1/z} \rfloor; \epsilon_{j+1} := S_j - m_j \cdot \frac{1}{z};$   
(c) set  $q_i^j := \frac{j+1}{z}$  for  $i = 1, \dots, m_j$ , and  $q_i^j := \frac{j}{z}$  for  $i = m_j + 1, \dots, n_j;$   
(d) for all  $i \in \{1, \dots, n_j\}$ , let  $Y_{j_i}$  be a  $\{0, 1\}$ -randmo variable with expectation  $q_i^j;$ 

Suppose that  $\{Y_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{L}^*(z)}$  are mutually independent.

\* It's easy to see that 
$$\epsilon_j < \frac{1}{z} \forall j$$
, and  $m_j \leq n_j$ .

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# Consider the interval $\mathcal{L}(z) := [0, \frac{\lfloor z^{\alpha} \rfloor}{z})$ (contd.)

For all j,

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n_j} q_i^j = m_j \frac{j+1}{z} + (n_j - m_j) \frac{j}{z} = n_j \frac{j}{z} + m_j \frac{1}{z} = n_j \frac{j}{z} + S_j - \epsilon_{j+1}$$
$$= n_j \frac{j}{z} + \sum_{i=1}^{n_j} \delta_i^j + \epsilon_j - \epsilon_{j+1}$$
$$= \sum_{i=1}^{n_j} p_i^j + \epsilon_j - \epsilon_{j+1}.$$

Thus,

$$\sum_{j=0}^{\lfloor z^lpha 
floor -1} \sum_{i=1}^{n_j} q_i^j = \sum_{j=0}^{\lfloor z^lpha 
floor -1} \sum_{i=1}^{n_j} p_i^j + \epsilon_0 - \epsilon_{\lfloor z^lpha 
floor}.$$

#### Lemma 1.1

$$\left|\sum_{i\in\mathcal{L}^*(z)}\mathbf{E}[Y_i]-\sum_{i\in\mathcal{L}^*(z)}\mathbf{E}[X_i]\right|=\left|\sum_{i\in\mathcal{L}^*(z)}q_i-\sum_{i\in\mathcal{L}^*(z)}p_i\right|\leq\frac{1}{z}.$$

### Poisson approximations

#### Lemma 1.2 [Barbour, Holst, Janson 1992]

Let  $J_1, \ldots, J_n$  be a sequence of independent random indicators with  $\mathbf{E}[J_i] = p_i$ . Then

$$\left\|\sum_{i=1}^{n} J_{i} - \mathsf{Poisson}\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_{i}\right)\right\| \leq \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_{i}^{2}}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_{i}}$$

#### Lemma 1.3

Let  $\lambda_1, \lambda_2 \in \mathbb{R}_+ \setminus \{0\}$ . Then,

$$\|\mathsf{Poisson}(\lambda_1) - \mathsf{Poisson}(\lambda_2)\| \le e^{|\lambda_1 - \lambda_2|} - e^{-|\lambda_1 - \lambda_2|}$$



### Proof of Lemma 1

Lemma 1

$$\left\|\sum_{i\in\mathcal{L}^*(z)}X_i-\sum_{i\in\mathcal{L}^*(z)}Y_i
ight\|\leq rac{3}{z^{1-lpha}}.$$

• By Lemma 1.2 we have

$$\left\|\sum_{i\in\mathcal{L}^*(z)}X_i-\operatorname{Poisson}\left(\sum_{i\in\mathcal{L}^*(z)}p_i\right)\right\|\leq \frac{\sum_{i\in\mathcal{L}^*(z)}p_i^2}{\sum_{i\in\mathcal{L}^*(z)}p_i^2}\leq \frac{z^{\alpha}}{z}$$

and

$$\left\|\sum_{i\in\mathcal{L}^*(z)}Y_i-\mathsf{Poisson}\left(\sum_{i\in\mathcal{L}^*(z)}q_i\right)\right\|\leq \frac{\sum_{i\in\mathcal{L}^*(z)}q_i^2}{\sum_{i\in\mathcal{L}^*(z)}q_i^2}\leq \frac{z^\alpha}{z}.$$

So,

$$\left\|\sum_{i \in \mathcal{L}^*(z)} X_i - \sum_{i \in \mathcal{L}^*(z)} Y_i\right\| \leq \frac{2}{z^{1-\alpha}} + (e^{1/z} - e^{-1/z}) \leq \frac{3}{z^{1-\alpha}}.$$



Consider the interval 
$$\mathcal{M}_1(z) := \left[ rac{\lfloor z^{lpha} 
floor}{z}, rac{z/2}{z} 
ight)$$

Define  $Y_i$ ,  $i \in \mathcal{M}_1^*(z)$  via the following iterative procedure.

• for 
$$j \leftarrow \lfloor z^{\alpha} \rfloor$$
 to  $\lfloor \frac{z}{2} \rfloor$ :  
(a)  $S_j := \sum_{i=1}^{n_j} \delta_i^j$ ;  
(b)  $m_j := \lfloor \frac{S_j}{1/z} \rfloor$ ;  
(c) set  $q_i^j := \frac{j+1}{z}$  for  $i = 1, \dots, m_j$ , and  $q_i^j := \frac{j}{z}$  for  $i = m_j + 1, \dots, n_j$ ;  
(d) for all  $i \in \{1, \dots, n_j\}$ , let  $Y_{j_i}$  be a  $\{0, 1\}$ -randmo variable with expectation  $q_i^j$ ;

Suppose that  $\{Y_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{M}_1^*(z)}$  are mutually independent.



# Quality of the rounding procedure

$$\zeta_j := \sum_{i \in I_j^*} \mathbf{E}[X_i] - \sum_{i \in I_j^*} \mathbf{E}[Y_i].$$

#### Lemma 2.1

For all  $j \in \{\lfloor z^{\alpha}, \dots, \lfloor \frac{z}{2} \rfloor\}$ , (a)  $\zeta_{j} = \sum_{i=1}^{n_{j}} \delta_{i}^{j} - m_{j} \cdot \frac{1}{z}$ . (b)  $0 \leq \zeta_{j} \leq \frac{1}{z}$ . (c)  $\sum_{i \in l_{j}^{*}} \operatorname{Var}[X_{i}] = n_{j} \frac{i}{z} (1 - \frac{i}{z}) + (1 - \frac{2j}{z}) \sum_{i=1}^{n_{j}} \delta_{i}^{j} - \sum_{i=1}^{n_{j}} (\delta_{i}^{j})^{2}$ . (d)  $\sum_{i \in l_{j}^{*}} \operatorname{Var}[Y_{i}] = n_{j} \frac{i}{z} (1 - \frac{i}{z}) + m_{j} \frac{1}{z} (1 - \frac{2j+1}{z})$ . (e)  $\sum_{i \in l_{i}^{*}} \operatorname{Var}[X_{i}] - \sum_{i \in l_{i}^{*}} \operatorname{Var}[Y_{i}] = (1 - \frac{2j}{z}) \zeta_{j} + (m_{j} \frac{1}{z^{2}} - \sum_{i=1}^{n_{j}} (\delta_{i}^{j})^{2})$ .



### Proof of Lemma 2

#### Lemma 2

$$\left\|\sum_{i\in\mathcal{M}_1^*(z)}X_i - \sum_{i\in\mathcal{M}_1^*(z)}Y_i\right\| \leq O(z^{-(\alpha+\beta-1)/2)}) + O(z^{-\alpha}) + O(z^{1/2}) + O(z^{-(1-\beta)}),$$

for some  $\beta \in (0, 1)$  such that  $\alpha + \beta > 1$ .

• Let's distinguish two possibilities for  $|\mathcal{M}_1^*(z)|$ :

- $|\mathcal{M}_1^*(z)| \leq z^{\beta};$
- $|\mathcal{M}_1^*(z)| > z^{\beta}$ .
- \* **Recall**:  $\beta \in (0, 1)$  such that  $\alpha + \beta > 1$ .



### Case 1 of Lemma 2's proof

#### Lemma 2.2

If 
$$|\mathcal{M}_1^*(z)| \leq z^{\beta}$$
, then  $\left\|\sum_{i \in \mathcal{M}_1^*(z)} X_i - \sum_{i \in \mathcal{M}_1^*(z)} Y_i\right\| \leq \frac{z^{\beta}}{z} = \frac{1}{z^{1-\beta}}$ .

• Choose a joint distribution on  $\{X_i\}_i \cup \{Y_i\}_i$  such that  $\Pr[X_i \neq Y_i] \leq \frac{1}{z}$ .

#### Coupling

X, Y: random variables with distribution  $\mathbb P$  and  $\mathbb Q$  on  $\Omega$  respectively.

 $\mathbb{W}$ : a distribution on  $\Omega \times \Omega$  is a **coupling** of  $(\mathbb{P}, \mathbb{Q})$  if

• 
$$\forall x \in \Omega$$
,  $\sum_{y \in \Omega} W(x, y) = \mathbb{P}(x)$ .

•  $\forall y \in \Omega, \sum_{x \in \Omega} W(x, y) = \mathbb{Q}(y).$ 

#### The coupling lemma

 $\|\mathbb{P} - \mathbb{Q}\| \le \Pr[X \neq Y].$ 

### Case 2 of Lemma 2's proof

#### Lemma 2.3

If 
$$|\mathcal{M}_1^*(z)| > z^{\beta}$$
, then
$$\left\|\sum_{i\in\mathcal{M}_1^*(z)} X_i - \sum_{i\in\mathcal{M}_1^*(z)} Y_i\right\| \le O(z^{-\frac{\alpha+\beta-1}{2}}) + O(k^{-\alpha}) + O(k^{-\frac{1}{2}}).$$



# Approximations by TPs

#### Lemma 2.4 [Röllin 2006]

Let  $J_1, \ldots, J_n$  be a sequence of independent random indicators with  $E[J_i] = p_i$ . Then

$$\left\|\sum_{i=1}^{n} J_{i} - TP(\mu, \sigma^{2})\right\| \leq \frac{\sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_{i}^{3}(1-p_{i})+2}}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_{i}(1-p_{i})}.$$

Lemma 2.5 [Barbour & Lindvall @J. Theoret. Prob. 2006]

Let  $\mu_1, \mu_2 \in \mathbb{R}$  and  $\sigma_1^2, \sigma_2^2 \in \mathbb{R}_+ \setminus \{0\}$  be such that  $\lfloor \mu_1 - \sigma_1^2 \rfloor \leq \lfloor \mu_2 - \sigma_2^2 \rfloor$ . Then,

$$\left\| TP(\mu_1, \sigma_1^2) - TP(\mu_2, \sigma_2^2) \right\| \leq \frac{|\mu_1 - \mu_2|}{\sigma_1} + \frac{|\sigma_1^2 - \sigma_2^2| + 1}{\sigma_1^2}.$$

#### Let

• 
$$p_i := \mathbf{E}[X_i], q_i = \mathbf{E}[Y_i], \forall i;$$
  
•  $\mu_1 = \sum_{i \in \mathcal{M}_1^*} p_i, \mu_2 = \sum_{i \in \mathcal{M}_1^*} q_i;$   
•  $\sigma_1^2 = \sum_{i \in \mathcal{M}_1^*} p_i(1 - p_i), \sigma_2^2 = \sum_{i \in \mathcal{M}_1^*} q_i(1 - q_i);$ 

#### Lemma 2.6

For any  $u \in (0, \frac{1}{2})$  and any set  $\{p_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{I}}$ , where  $p_i \in [u, \frac{1}{2}]$  for all  $i \in \mathcal{I}$ , then

$$\frac{\sqrt{\sum_{i\in\mathcal{I}}p_i^3(1-p_i)}}{\sum_{i\in\mathcal{I}}p_i(1-p_i)} \leq \frac{1+2u+4u^2-8u^3}{\sqrt{16|\mathcal{I}|(1-u-4u^2+4u^3)}}$$

#### Lemma 2.7

For the parameters specified above,

$$\left\| \mathsf{TP}(\mu_1, \sigma_1^2) - \mathsf{TP}(\mu_2, \sigma_2^2) \right\| \le O(k^{-\alpha}) + O(k^{-1/2}).$$

Proofs are omitted.

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# Thank you.



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