

When Do Prediction Market Makers Make Profits?

Po-An Chen^{*}, Yiling Chen[†], Chi-Jen Lu[‡], Chuang-Chieh Lin[§]

IIM, National Yang-Ming Chiao-Tung University^{*}

SEAS, Harvard[†]

IIS, Academia Sinica[‡]

CSIE, Tamkang University[§]

Speaker: Chuang-Chieh Lin (Joseph)

AAAC'21, Section A2

23 October 2021

Outline

- Introduction: Prediction Markets
- Preliminaries
 - Designing the Cost Function via Conjugate Duality.
 - Equivalence between Market Making and Online Learning
 - Predictable Sequences
- Profitable Market Making via Online Learning
 - Optimistic Lazy-Update Online Mirror Descents with Predictable Sequences
 - Expert Setting: Modified Double Multiplicative Updates with Predictable Sequences
- Future Work

- A prediction market can be viewed as
 - information aggregation of the traders
 - traders' collective estimate of how likely the associated event will occur.
- Prediction markets focus on information aggregation.



A. Mann: The power of prediction markets. *Nature* 538, 308–310 (2016).

Prediction Markets

- E.g., Arrow-Debreu securities:
 - Certain security pays \$1 if a particular state of the world is reached.
 - A risk-neutral trader believing that the prob. of event occurring is p
 - Buying/selling this security if the price is below/above p
 - E.g., insurance contracts, options, futures, and many other financial derivatives
- The information of the trader can be capitalized.

(Automated) Market Makers

- An **automated market maker**: an institution *adaptively setting prices* for each security and accepting trades at these prices all the time.
- A common goal: *the worst-case loss is minimized*.
- A **complete** securities market: offering a finite number of linearly independent securities over a set \mathcal{O} of mutually exclusive and exhaustive outcomes [Arrow 1964].
 - A trader may bet on any combination of the securities in a complete securities market.
- **Our goal**: **profit** guarantee in automated market making
 - in terms of **negative regrets** under appropriate *patterns of trade sequences*.

Market making Using Cost Function + Conjugate Duality (1/2)

[Abernethy, Chen & Vaughan TEAC 2012].

- Outcome space \mathcal{O} .
- N securities by a payoff function $\rho : \mathcal{O} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^N$.
 - $\rho_i : (\mathbf{o}) \in \{0, 1\}$ for $\mathbf{o} \in \mathbf{O}$ and security i .
- Convex compact price space $\Pi = \mathcal{H}(\rho(\mathcal{O}))$.

Market making Using Cost Function + Conjugate Duality (1/2)

[Abernethy, Chen & Vaughan TEAC 2012].

- Outcome space \mathcal{O} .
- N securities by a payoff function $\rho : \mathcal{O} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^N$.
 - $\rho_i : (\mathbf{o}) \in \{0, 1\}$ for $\mathbf{o} \in \mathbf{O}$ and security i .
- Convex compact price space $\Pi = \mathcal{H}(\rho(\mathcal{O}))$.
- Cost function $C : \mathbb{R}^N \mapsto \mathbb{R}$ with

$$C(\mathbf{q}) = \max_{\mathbf{x} \in \Pi} \mathbf{x} \cdot \mathbf{q} - R(\mathbf{x})$$

- A convex R with $\text{relint}(\Pi) \subseteq \text{dom}(R)$.
- A quantity vector $\mathbf{q}_t = \mathbf{q}_{t-1} + \mathbf{p}_t$ for security bundle purchases \mathbf{p}_t .

Market making Using Cost Function + Conjugate Duality (1/2)

[Abernethy, Chen & Vaughan TEAC 2012].

- Outcome space \mathcal{O} .
- N securities by a payoff function $\rho : \mathcal{O} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^N$.
 - $\rho_i : (\mathbf{o}) \in \{0, 1\}$ for $\mathbf{o} \in \mathbf{O}$ and security i .
- Convex compact price space $\Pi = \mathcal{H}(\rho(\mathcal{O}))$.
- Cost function $C : \mathbb{R}^N \mapsto \mathbb{R}$ with

$$C(\mathbf{q}) = \max_{\mathbf{x} \in \Pi} \mathbf{x} \cdot \mathbf{q} - R(\mathbf{x})$$

- A convex R with $\text{relint}(\Pi) \subseteq \text{dom}(R)$.
- A quantity vector $\mathbf{q}_t = \mathbf{q}_{t-1} + \mathbf{p}_t$ for security bundle purchases \mathbf{p}_t .
- Set the price $\mathbf{x}_t = \arg \max_{\mathbf{x} \in \Pi} \mathbf{x} \cdot \mathbf{q}_t - R(\mathbf{x})$.

Market making Using Cost Function + Conjugate Duality (1/2)

[Abernethy, Chen & Vaughan TEAC 2012].

- Outcome space \mathcal{O} .
- N securities by a payoff function $\rho : \mathcal{O} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^N$.
 - $\rho_i : (\mathbf{o}) \in \{0, 1\}$ for $\mathbf{o} \in \mathbf{O}$ and security i .
- Convex compact price space $\Pi = \mathcal{H}(\rho(\mathcal{O}))$.
- Cost function $C : \mathbb{R}^N \mapsto \mathbb{R}$ with


$$C(\mathbf{q}) = \max_{\mathbf{x} \in \Pi} \mathbf{x} \cdot \mathbf{q} - R(\mathbf{x})$$

- A convex R with $\text{relint}(\Pi) \subseteq \text{dom}(R)$.
- A quantity vector $\mathbf{q}_t = \mathbf{q}_{t-1} + \mathbf{p}_t$ for security bundle purchases \mathbf{p}_t .
- Set the price $\mathbf{x}_t = \arg \max_{\mathbf{x} \in \Pi} \mathbf{x} \cdot \mathbf{q}_t - R(\mathbf{x})$.
- The worst-case lost: $-(C(\mathbf{q}_T) - C(\mathbf{q}_0) - \max_{\mathbf{x} \in \Pi} \mathbf{x} \cdot \mathbf{q}_T)$.

Market making Using Cost Function + Conjugate Duality (2/2)

$$\begin{aligned}
 C(\mathbf{q}_T) - C(\mathbf{q}_0) &= \sum_{t=1}^T C(\mathbf{q}_t) - C(\mathbf{q}_{t-1}) \\
 &\approx \sum_{t=1}^T \nabla C(\mathbf{q}_{t-1}) \cdot (\mathbf{q}_t - \mathbf{q}_{t-1}) = \sum_{t=1}^T \mathbf{x}_t \cdot \mathbf{p}_t
 \end{aligned}$$

- The instantaneous price $\mathbf{x}_t = \nabla C(\mathbf{q}_{t-1})$.
- The worst-case loss of the market maker $\approx \max_{\mathbf{x} \in \Pi} \mathbf{x} \cdot \mathbf{q}_T - \sum_{t=1}^T \mathbf{x}_t \cdot \mathbf{p}_t$.



Correspondence b/w Market Making & Online Learning

- Considering security bundles \mathbf{p}_t as the negative loss vectors ℓ_t ,
 \Rightarrow **the duality-based cost function market maker becomes FTRL**
[Chen & Vaughan EC'10, Abernethy, Chen & Vaughan TEAC 2012].

- Online linear optimization problem using FTRL:
 - ① The learner given access to a fixed space of weights $\mathcal{K} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^N$
 - ② Select a weight vector $\mathbf{x}_t \in \mathcal{K}$.
 - ③ Uses a convex regularizer $\mathcal{R}(\cdot)$, a parameter of FTRL.
 - ④ Receives loss vectors $f_t(\mathbf{x}_t) = \langle \ell_t, \mathbf{x}_t \rangle$. A cumulative loss vector L_t updated according to $L_t = L_{t-1} + \ell_t$
 - ⑤ FTRL selects the weights by solving

$$\mathbf{x}_t = \arg \min_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{K}} [\sum_{s=1}^{t-1} f_s(\mathbf{x}) + \frac{1}{\eta} \mathcal{R}(\mathbf{x})].$$
 - ⑥ The learner's regret: $\sum_{t=1} \mathbf{x}_t \cdot f_t - \min_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{K}} \mathbf{x} \cdot L_T$

Predictable Sequences (1/2)

- “Regular” or “predictable” sequences [Rakhlin & Sridharan COLT'13]:
For $t \in \{1, \dots, T\}$, $M_t : \mathcal{F}^{t-1} \mapsto \mathcal{F}$:

$$M_1, M_2(\ell_1), \dots, M_T(\ell_1, \dots, \ell_{T-1}).$$

$\Rightarrow M_t(\ell_1, \dots, \ell_{t-1}) = \ell_t$ for all t .

- $\{\ell_t\}_{t \geq 1}$: a noiseless time series.

Predictable Sequences (1/2)

- “Regular” or “predictable” sequences [Rakhlin & Sridharan COLT'13]:
For $t \in \{1, \dots, T\}$, $M_t : \mathcal{F}^{t-1} \mapsto \mathcal{F}$:

$$M_1, M_2(\ell_1), \dots, M_T(\ell_1, \dots, \ell_{T-1}).$$

$\Rightarrow M_t(\ell_1, \dots, \ell_{t-1}) = \ell_t$ for all t .

- $\{\ell_t\}_{t \geq 1}$: a noiseless time series.

This suffers no regret.

Predictable Sequences (1/2)

- “Regular” or “predictable” sequences [Rakhlin & Sridharan COLT'13]:
For $t \in \{1, \dots, T\}$, $M_t : \mathcal{F}^{t-1} \mapsto \mathcal{F}$:

$$M_1, M_2(\ell_1), \dots, M_T(\ell_1, \dots, \ell_{T-1}).$$

$\Rightarrow M_t(\ell_1, \dots, \ell_{t-1}) = \ell_t$ for all t .

- $\{\ell_t\}_{t \geq 1}$: a noiseless time series.

This suffers no regret.

- Consider $M_t(\ell_1, \dots, \ell_{t-1}) \approx \ell_t$, for all t .

Predictable Sequences (1/2)

- “Regular” or “predictable” sequences [Rakhlin & Sridharan COLT'13]:
For $t \in \{1, \dots, T\}$, $M_t : \mathcal{F}^{t-1} \mapsto \mathcal{F}$:

$$M_1, M_2(\ell_1), \dots, M_T(\ell_1, \dots, \ell_{T-1}).$$

$\Rightarrow M_t(\ell_1, \dots, \ell_{t-1}) = \ell_t$ for all t .

- $\{\ell_t\}_{t \geq 1}$: a noiseless time series.

This suffers no regret.

- Consider $M_t(\ell_1, \dots, \ell_{t-1}) \approx \ell_t$, for all t .
 - $\{\ell_t\}_{t \geq 1}$: a predictable sequence plus adversarial noise.

Predictable Sequences (2/2)

- L_p -deviation for the loss functions $\{f_t\}$:

$$D_p = \sum_{t=1}^T \max_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{X}} \|\nabla f_t(\mathbf{x}) - \nabla f_{t-1}(\mathbf{x})\|_p^2.$$

- Low deviation $\Rightarrow \ell_t \approx \ell_{t-1}$, so we focus on $M_t(\ell_1, \dots, \ell_{t-1}) = \ell_{t-1}$.

Theorems [Chiang *et al.* COLT'12]

When the L_2 -deviation is D_2 , the regret of the algorithm is $O(\sqrt{D_2})$.

When the L_∞ -deviation is D_∞ , the regret of the algorithm is $O(\sqrt{D_\infty \ln N})$.

Optimistic Lazy-Update Online Mirror Descents (1/3)

- **Inspiration:** the **double** online mirror descent [Chiang *et al.* COLT'12].
- We propose the **optimistic** lazy-update online mirror descent algorithm (OLU-OMD) for predictable sequences.
 - We focus on the case that $M_t(\ell_1, \dots, \ell_{t-1}) = \ell_{t-1}$.
 - **Double** lazy-update online mirror descent.

Algorithm OLU-OMD

- 1 Let $\mathbf{x}_1 = \hat{\mathbf{x}}_1 = \mathbf{y}_1 = (\frac{1}{N}, \dots, \frac{1}{N})^\top$.
- 2 **for** $t \in [T]$ **do**
 - Receive f_t and compute $\ell_t = \nabla f_t(\hat{\mathbf{x}}_t)$.
 - Update

$$\mathbf{x}_{t+1} = \arg \min_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{X}} \mathcal{B}^{\mathcal{R}}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}_{t+1}) \text{ for } \nabla \mathcal{R}(\mathbf{y}_{t+1}) = \nabla \mathcal{R}(\mathbf{y}_t) - \eta_t \ell_t,$$

$$\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{t+1} = \arg \min_{\hat{\mathbf{x}} \in \mathcal{X}} \mathcal{B}^{\mathcal{R}}(\hat{\mathbf{x}}, \hat{\mathbf{y}}_{t+1}) \text{ for } \nabla \mathcal{R}(\hat{\mathbf{y}}_{t+1}) = \nabla \mathcal{R}(\mathbf{y}_{t+1}) - \eta_t M_{t+1}.$$

Optimistic Lazy-Update Online Mirror Descents (2/3)

Regard OLU-OMD as “Be The Regularized Leader with Predictors”.

Lemma 1

According to the first update of OLU-OMD, $\nabla R_t(\mathbf{y}_{t+1}) = \nabla R_t(\mathbf{y}_t) - \eta_t \ell_t$ and $\mathbf{x}_{t+1} = \mathcal{B}^{R_t}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}_{t+1})$, we have

$$\mathbf{x}_{t+1} = \arg \min_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{K}} \left(\eta_t \left\langle \sum_{s=1}^t \ell_s, \mathbf{x} \right\rangle + R(\mathbf{x}) \right).$$

For the second update, $\nabla R(\hat{\mathbf{y}}_{t+1}) = \nabla R(\mathbf{y}_{t+1}) - \eta_t M_{t+1}$ and $\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{t+1} = \mathcal{B}^{R_t}(\hat{\mathbf{x}}, \mathbf{y}_{t+1})$, we have

$$\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{t+1} = \arg \min_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{K}} \left(\eta_t \left\langle \sum_{s=1}^t \ell_s + M_{t+1}, \mathbf{x} \right\rangle + R(\mathbf{x}) \right).$$

Optimistic Lazy-Update Online Mirror Descents (3/3)

Regard OLU-OMD as “**Be The Regularized Leader (BTRL) + Predictors**”.

Lemma 1

According to the first update of OLU-OMD, $\nabla R_t(\mathbf{y}_{t+1}) = \nabla R_t(\mathbf{y}_t) - \eta_t \ell_t$ and $\mathbf{x}_{t+1} = \mathcal{B}^{R_t}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}_{t+1})$, we have

$$\mathbf{x}_{t+1} = \arg \min_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{K}} \left(\eta_t \left\langle \sum_{s=1}^t \ell_s, \mathbf{x} \right\rangle + R(\mathbf{x}) \right).$$

For the second update with $M_{t+1} = \ell_t$, $\nabla R(\hat{\mathbf{y}}_{t+1}) = \nabla R(\mathbf{y}_{t+1}) - \eta_t \ell_t$ and $\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{t+1} = \mathcal{B}^{R_t}(\hat{\mathbf{x}}, \mathbf{y}_{t+1})$, we have

$$\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{t+1} = \arg \min_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{K}} \left(\eta_t \left\langle \sum_{s=1}^t \ell_s + \ell_t, \mathbf{x} \right\rangle + R(\mathbf{x}) \right).$$

Implementation of BTRL

- The cumulative loss of BTRL can be obtained by evaluating

$$\sum_{t=1}^T \langle \ell_t, \mathbf{x}_{t+1} \rangle, \text{ where } \mathbf{x}_{t+1} \text{ is from FTRL.}$$


- Let $L_t := \langle \sum_{s=1}^t \ell_s, \mathbf{x} \rangle$, for all t .
- Let $\mathbf{x}_1 := \arg \min_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{K}} R(\mathbf{x})$ and

$$\mathbf{x}_{t_j+1} \in \arg \min_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{K}} \left\{ L_{t_j}(\mathbf{x}) + \frac{R(\mathbf{x})}{\eta} \right\}.$$

Implementation of BTRL + Changes of Leaders

● : NEW algorithm-selected leader

● : unchanged algorithm-selected leader



Condition 1: Frequent Changes of Strong Leaders

Main Theorem 1

If $M_t(\ell_1, \dots, \ell_{t-1}) = \ell_{t-1}$ and for all $t \in \{1, \dots, T\}$, with $L_t(\mathbf{x}) - L_t(\mathbf{x}_{t+1}) \geq \delta$ for all $\mathbf{x} \notin \arg \min_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{K}} L_t(\mathbf{x})$ over k changes of leaders, then the regret of OLU-OMD is

$$\sum_{t=1}^T \langle \ell_t, \hat{\mathbf{x}}_t \rangle - L_T(\mathbf{x}^*) = O \left(\sqrt{\sum_{t=1}^T \|\ell_t\|_2 \|\ell_t - \ell_{t-1}\|_2} \right) - \delta k,$$

where $\eta_t = \frac{1}{\sqrt{\sum_{s=1}^{t-1} \|\ell_s\|_2 \|\ell_s - \ell_{s-1}\|_2}}$.

Condition 2: Periodic Changes of DOMINANT Experts (1/2)

- To ease the discussion, we consider the *reward maximizing* setting of two experts.
 - ⇒ Modified Optimistic Multiplicative Updates (OMU) [Chiang, Lee, & Lu 2011] for predictable sequences.
- A reward maximization model with experts of $\{0, 1\}$ -rewards, each $r_i^{(t)} \in \{0, 1\}$ for $i \in \{1, 2\}$: a dominant expert gives a reward of 1.

Condition 2: Periodic Changes of DOMINANT Experts (1/2)

- To ease the discussion, we consider the *reward maximizing* setting of two experts.
 - ⇒ Modified Optimistic Multiplicative Updates (OMU) [Chiang, Lee, & Lu 2011] for predictable sequences.
- A reward maximization model with experts of $\{0, 1\}$ -rewards, each $r_i^{(t)} \in \{0, 1\}$ for $i \in \{1, 2\}$: a dominant expert gives a reward of 1.
- **The Tricky Cae:** Only few changes of dominant experts.
 - The BTRL algorithm cannot change leaders promptly enough.

Condition 2: Periodic Changes of DOMINANT Experts (2/2)

Try to catch up with the changes of dominant experts quickly enough!

Modified Optimistic Multiplicative Updates [MOMU] [Chiang, Lee & Lu 2011]

- Let $\bar{\mathbf{x}}^{(1)} = \mathbf{x}^{(1)} = \hat{\mathbf{x}}^{(1)} = (\frac{1}{N}, \dots, \frac{1}{N})^\top$

- for** $t \in [T]$ **do**

Receive f_t and compute $\mathbf{r}_t = \nabla f_t(\hat{\mathbf{x}}^t)$.

Update for $i \in \{1, \dots, N\}$:

$$\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{t+1}^{(i)} = \mathbf{x}_t^{(i)} e^{\eta \mathbf{r}_t^{(i)}} / \bar{Z}_{t+1} \text{ with } \bar{Z}_{t+1} = \sum_j \mathbf{x}_t^{(j)} e^{\eta \mathbf{r}_t^{(j)}},$$

$$\mathbf{x}_{t+1}^{(i)} = (1 - \beta) \bar{\mathbf{x}}_{t+1}^{(i)} + \beta \frac{1}{N},$$

$$\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{t+1}^{(i)} = \mathbf{x}_{t+1}^{(i)} e^{\eta \mathbf{r}_t^{(i)}} / \hat{Z}_{t+1} \text{ with } \hat{Z}_{t+1} = \sum_j \mathbf{x}_{t+1}^{(j)} e^{\eta \mathbf{r}_t^{(j)}}.$$

- $\beta = \frac{1}{t}$
- $M_{t+1} = \ell_t$

Few Changes of Dominant Experts

- We have k periods of time, each defined by an dominant expert.
 - The dominant expert is alternating $\Rightarrow D_\infty = k$.
- **Claim:** After the end of any period, it takes at most $O(\log(T/k)/\eta)$ time steps for the ratio of the previous dominant expert's probability to the probability of the dominant expert in current period to achieve at most 1 again.

Main Theorem 2

The regret of MOMU is $O(-T/2 + (k-1)\log(T/k)/\eta)$. With $\eta = O(1/\sqrt{D_\infty}) = O(1/\sqrt{k})$, the regret is

$$O(-T/2 - \sqrt{k}\log(T/k) + k^{\frac{3}{2}}\log(T/k)).$$

Future Work

- Complementing our finding with experimental results.
- A “passive” market maker makes profit of a security by placing *limit orders as bids and asks* to reap the bid-ask spreads on the orderbook, yet takes exposure risk of the inventory.
 - A promising direction of market making design to try is to combine the merits of both the designs.

Thanks for your attention.